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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellants are an elderly couple that has moved from the site of the dispute. 
Their children have carried forth with the litigation which brings us before this court. Linda 
Penning is the daughter, acting agent for the appellants, and her affidavit in opposition to the 
respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment is in the clerk file.1 
This case involves a boundary dispute between the parties. An old fence had existed 
for numerous years between the real properties of the two parties. The old fence ran east 
and west which separated the two properties. The respondents' real property is on the north 
and the appellants' real property is on the south. This property is located in the town site of 
Ammon, Bonneville County, Idaho. The respondents built a house on the north side of a 
fence. The appellants had not lived in the old house on the south side for numerous years 
because of age. The "old fence" fell in to a state of disrepair and was removed by the 
respondents.2 
Set forth hereafter, per the appellate rules, is a visual aid of the real property. 
(See Paragraph 22 of the complaint for the survey visual as attached hereafter)3 
1 R. Vol. I., p.112; Exhibit C, Answer to Interrogatory 1. 
2 R. Vol. I, p. 125; Exhibit D. 
3 R., Vol. I, p. 11. 
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The survey drawing shows that the original point of the old fence stayed the same on 
the right hand side of the drawing by Western Avenue. The old fence was then angled which 
created about a 9-12 foot variance on the left side of the drawing near the canal. This is the 
tract of land in dispute. The appellants believed and alleged4 that the fence was supposed 
to be on the new survey line placed the same across the survey markers without going onto 
the Fischer property. It should be noted that the "old fence" was completely tom down and 
destroyed at the time of the survey with the "new fence" in place.5 
Obviously, marks existed for the survey company to determine where the old fence 
was located. Otherwise, the survey could not have determined the location of the old fence. 
This will be an important fact discussed later on. (See survey above). 
The history and chain-of-title is not disputed by either party. The actual placement 
of the new fence is the dispute. The respondents had placed sand and building materials 
well into the property of the appellants and had used the appellants' property as a 
tum-around for larger vehicles.6 Thus, the appellants requested the respondents to stop 
using the southerly ground and did place" no trespassing signs" when a letter arrived from 
the respondent via their legal counsel. 7 
The parties supported their respective positions with pleadings, affidavits, 
declarations and memoranda. The court granted summary judgment to the respondents 
and quieted title in the disputed property in the respondents. The district court held that the 
appellants technically trespassed and gave a sum of money for attorney fees under the 
trespass statutes. The district court, as alleged and believed, did not consider the sand and 
4 See footnote 2; Id. 
5 R., Vol. I, pp. 77-78. 
6 R., Vol. I., p. 125. 
7 R., Vol. I, pp. 77, 78, 139, 140. 
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materials placed on the appellant property as a trespass. The counter-claim of the appellants 
was dismissed. (See Memorandum Decision).8 
The facts, believed to be accurate relying on both the written submissions of both of 
the parties, are as follows: 
1. An old fence that had separated the real properties was in a complete state of 
disrepair and was removed by the plaintiffs/respondents. The fence no longer 
existed.9 
2. The plaintiffs/respondents obtained a survey from Ellsworth Engineering to 
determine the boundary lines per engineered standards.10 
3. The material disputed facts are that the parties agreed to be bound by the survey 
and place a new fence on the survey line. The defendants/appellants would 
argue that no reason existed to obtain a survey unless the parties were going to rely 
upon the survey. The respondents did accomplish the task of obtaining the 
survey. The respondents disagree with the new fence being placed on the 
surveyed line.11 
4. The respondents/plaintiff also removed a ditch and placed a large amount of 
gravel about the area in question.12 
5. The appellants/defendants placed a fence on the survey line as prepared by the 
engineer work and the pins that were placed by said engineers.13 
8 R., Vol. I, p. 251. 
9 R., Vol. I, p. 70, par. 8; p. 165. 
10 R., Vol. I, pp. 10, 11; Par. 22 of Complaint. 
11 R., Vol.I, pp. 70, par. 9-10; 112, 119, 124, 127. 
12 R., Vol. I, p. 125. 
13 R., Vol. I, pp. 77, 78. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The summary judgment standard of review is well-known by most, if not all, 
practicing attorneys in the State ofldaho. I.R.C.P., Rule 56(c) states: Summary judgment is 
only appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law." If reasonable minds might come to different conclusions summary 
judgment is inappropriate. McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 64 P.3d 317 (2003). 
The U.S. Supreme Court case of Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317; 106 S.Ct. 2548 
(1986) has guided courts throughout the jurisdictions on the standard to be used. Idaho has 
numerous cases on the standard for summary judgment. On appeal, the standard is as 
follows: 
On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court employs the 
same standard as used by the district court originally ruling on the motion. Mutual of 
Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Pedersen, 133 Idaho 135, 138, 983 P.2d 208, 211 (1999); McKay v. Owens, 
130 Idaho 148,152,937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). This Court liberally construes all disputed facts in favor of the 
non-moving party, and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the 
record in favor of the party opposing the motion. Wensman v. Farmers Insur. Co. of Idaho, 
134 Idaho 148, 151, 997 P.2d 609, 612 (2000). If reasonable people could reach different 
conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, the motion must be denied. Id. 
However, if the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, only a question of law 
8 
remains, and this Court exercises free review. Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson, 
& Tucker, Chtd., 133 Idaho 1, 4, 981 P.2d 236, 239 (1999). 
ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE GRANTED AT TRIAL AND ON APPEAL 
For the reasons stated later in this brief, fees and costs should be granted on appeal 
and for the trial work. 
ARGUMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
Boundary by agreement or by acquiescence is not applicable to this cause. The 
events which took place between the parties had nothing to do with the years prior to the old 
fence and the history of the two properties. The par+..ies either entered into an agreement to 
relocate the fence or, on the other hand, did not reach such an arrangement. Under either 
scenario, the court has conflicting versions of the material facts on this issue. Thus, 
summary judgment could not be granted. The appellants rely upon both of the party's 
declarations, sworn statements, pleadings and documents. 
For instance, the following factual assertions preclude summary judgment. 
1. The affidavit of Linda Penning disputes the assertions of the plaintiffs as to a 
non-agreement. 
2. The plaintiff tore down whatever remained of the old fence. In reality, an old 
fence no longer existed. The plaintiffs also removed natural landmarks such as a 
ditch AND hauled in gravel to supplement the area in question. 
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3. The old fence no longer existed. Therefore, how did either party use the land up 
to the old fence or claim adversity to the fence that no longer was in existence? 
4. Exhibit D to the affidavit of Linda Penning indicates that the plaintiffs stated: 
"They believed that there was already an agreement in place ... "14 See also, 
Exhibit F to the declaration of Fischer.15 
5. The plaintiffs argue for fees and yet they "demolished the existing fence". See 
Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851 (2010). They are guilty of the very issue that they 
are trying to enforce. See also, Exhibit D to the declaration of Fischer. See the 
threats to the elderly Mrs. Croston, Exhibit H to Declaration of Fischer. 
6. Exhibit L to the declaration of Fisher shows no fence and the gravel that was to be 
spread on the appellants'/ defendants' property. 
Until the factual basis can be determined it is difficult, if not impossible to apply legal 
theories. The plaintiffs argue legal theories pertaining to the boundaries; on the theories of 
trespass; on the issue of fees and other related matters. Until the fact-finder determines the 
facts, the briefing of the parties is nothing more than pre-trial opinions. 
II. BOUDARY BY AGREEMENT WITH ACQUIESCENCE. 
The lower court correctly defines boundary by agreement on page 5 of its 
memorandum decision. The court quotes Flying Elk Inv., LLC v. Cornwall, 149 Idaho 9, 
232 P.3d 330 (2010); Sims v. Daker, 154 Idaho 975, 303 P.3d 1231 (2013). The appellants have 
no disagreement that a boundary is established, as in the instant case, after being in place for 
numerous years by monument such as a fence.· However, in the instant case, the 
14 R., Vol. I., p. 178. 
15 R. Vol. I, p. 127. 
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respondents removed the fence and obtained a survey to determine the actual boundary. 
The appellants believed and thought an agreement existed to place the new boundary on the 
actual true line of the survey. 
The issue is not whether the fence constituted the old boundary but rather did the 
parties jointly abandon the old fence markings and establish the boundary based upon the 
actual and correct survey markings. Appellants believe that was the case; and the 
respondents disagreed at summary judgment. This is a material issue of fact that precluded 
summary judgment. 
The court even states at page 6 of its decision: "Once the fence line had fallen down 
or was removed, it would be possible for the Parties to make an oral agreement fixing a new 
fence line as the properties' boundary. (Citations omitted)."16 
The district court then goes on to make inferences which are susceptible of various 
reasonable interpretations. The court states that no evidence to support a claim that an 
agreement existed between the two owners. That is correct because the Crostons are very 
elderly. However, there can be no mistake that the children of the Crostons were acting as 
agents for their parents and had direct communications with the Fishers. 
The court then goes on to state, by way of inference, that Mrs. Fischer would have no 
way of knowing that the new survey line would differ from the old fence line. If that were the 
case, why would anyone purchase a new survey. The parties could simply place the fence 
where the old holes and marks existed. The reasoning of the lower court is flawed in 
believing that another interpretation is just as plausible. The court then goes on to state that 
16 R., Vol. I, p. 248. 
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the comments by Penning were not sufficiently clear to give rise to an enforceable agreement 
to change the property line. 
Penning states, in her affidavit at paragraph 8, as follows: 
"I was present on an earlier date when Ann Fischer indicated that the fence was being 
tom down, a new survey was being obt~ined and the new fence would be placed on 
the new survey line."17 
Furthermore, Jim Croston's statement is contained in the respondents' declaration of 
their attorney citing the discovery responses of appellant at page 127 of the record. His 
statement is as follows: 
I went to my parent's property at 3020 E. Western Ave. Ammon, 10 after the Fischers took It 
out their fence and filled In their Irrigation ditch. This was on August 30, 2015. I was marking 
and measuring where the original fence had been. Ms. Fischer came out and asked me who I 
was and what I was doing. 
I answered her questions. When I told her I was determining where the fence line used to be, 
she replied, "We will be replacing the fence with a much better fence. We are going to get a 
survey to find out where the line Is at. We are using the same surveyors as the City uses so 
shouldn't be any disputes." 
I said OK. Ms. Fischer then returned to her house. 
Certainly, the actions taken by the appellants in being very precise in placing a new 
fence on the surveyed line give rise to an extreme inference that an agreement had been 
reached.18 Various exhibits and photographs exist showing this detailed and measured 
analysis. The small nature of the land in question would not be of great value. However, 
the true line of the land and to prevent the respondents from turning vehicles and placing 
materials on the appellants' land is in question. 
The district court then makes a hyper-technical analysis that no consideration was 
supplied by the appellants, Crostons, for the alleged agreement. The appellants supplied all 
of the materials and work for the new fence. This is consideration. The Respondents did not 
17 R., Vol. I, p. 165. 
18 R., Vol. I, pp. 77, 78. 
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pay for anything on this phase. The lower court is in error when it asserts that consideration 
was lacking. 
Summarizing the summary judgment ruling, it is alleged the lower court's analysis is 
misguided as follows: 
-Pleadings: Appellants assert in the Second, Third and Fourth affirmative defenses 
of the Answer that an oral agreement existed for the placement of a new fence on the surveyed 
line.19 
-Affidavit of Linda Penning cited above acknowledging an oral agreement. 
-Discovery responses of appellant citing the statement of Jim Croston as set forth 
above. 
-The respondents disagree via the declaration of Ann Fischer.20 
COUNTERCLAIM. 
The lower court dismissed the counterclaim because it states there was no agreement 
to breach. The appellants had asked for one-half of the cost of the new fence. Thus, the 
court should have been aware that there was consideration for the installation of the new 
fence. It follows logically that if the summary judgment fails, the counterclaim is reinstated; 
and, vice versa.21 
IV. TRESPASS. 
The appellants could not have trespassed if the strip in question was unknown. 
There is no question the appellants went on the strip of land but never into the respondent 
19 R. Vol. I, p. 23.; See also Par. E of counterclaim at p. 24. 
20 R. Vol. I, p. 70, Par. 9, 10. 
21 R. Vol. I, p. 251. 
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land that was declared to be the respondent land. The appellants could not have trespassed 
because the court had never quieted title in the respondents. The appellants could not have 
trespassed on land that had never been declared to be owned by respondents. Until the same 
was or is the respondent land, then the appellants could not trespass despite the repeated 
trespasses of the respondents driving and storing materials on the appellants' land.22 
ATTORNEY FEES AT TRIAL AND APPLICABLE ON APPEAL 
Idaho follows what has been named "the American Rule"23 when deciding the issue 
of attorney fees. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho has in place, for numerous years, 
guidance on this issue. The first major treatise on the issue was written by Lon Davis, Esq in 
1990. He was the personal attorney for the Idaho Supreme Court for numerous years. A 
treatise was updated by the Hon. Jesse Walters entitled, "A Primer for Awarding Attorney 
Fees in Idaho", Idaho Law Review, Volume 38, Number 1 (2001). The Walters publication 
explains the major statutes and all cases through the date of the publication. His treatise 
walks the reader through every step in the fee award process. According to the Justice, fees 
cannot be awarded as an "equity" determination or by the court sua sponte if not claimed 
under a pertinent statute. There is no inherent power of the court to award attorney fees. 
In sum, there must be a statute or rule to rely upon except in limited circumstances.24 
Therefore, in the instant case the appellant relies upon the statutory language of I.C. 
Section 12-121 which must be read in conjunction with IRCP, Rule 54 wherein the case must 
be[ brought or defended) frivolously, without foundation and so forth. IRCP, Rule 54(e)(1). 
22 R. Vol. I, p. 251. 
23 The American Rule only allows for fees if tnere is an underlying statute or contract for 
entitlement. 
24 One noted exception is the Private .-\ttorney General provision which is not relevant in the case at bar. 
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This is the "frivolous' section that applies to fees. 
The court is well aware that the fence in ·question was not maintained, was in disrepair 
and did not even exist in places throughout the fence line. Further, there was gravel stacked 
on the property of the appellants encroaching on the line. An examination of the affidavits 
granting summary judgment calls into question the verbal agreement of the parties as to 
placing the new fence on the new surveyed boundary. 
Remember that the plaintiffs sought a new survey which should persuade the court 
that there was some reason for the parties to believe that the new survey was important to 
settle the case. The court did not even need the survey; yet, the plaintiffs desired a survey. 
It does provide that the parties were of some belief that the survey was important. 
Additionally, the court was aware that only a temporary fence was placed on the 
survey line by the defendants until the court could rule. Thus, the defendants were trying to 
wait until a solution could be resolved. 
Fees and Costs are set by statute. 
The factors of 54(e) are as follows: 
Rule 54(e)(3). Amount of attorney fees. In the event the court grants 
attorney fees to a party or parties in a civil action it shall consider the following 
factors in determining the amount of such fees: 
(A) The time and labor required. 
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions. 
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the 
experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law. 
(D) The prevailing charges for like work. 
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of 
the case. 
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained. 
(H) The undesirability of the case. 
I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. 
(J) Awards in similar cases. 
K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted 
15 
Legal Research), if the court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a 
party's case. 
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular 
case. 
In sum, a statutory basis must exist for the award of fees; and, the rule [54] 
provides fees for the prevailing party. Costs are determined as of right and by discretion 
pursuant to IRCP, Rule 54(d)(1). Therefore, the court fixes the appropriate award. As 
discussed above, §12-121 applies because the case was defended properly and in good faith. 
The court erred in granting summary judgment as it is clear there are contested facts. 
It is clear that the court questioned the grant of summary judgment. In the 
order on attorney fees the court stated: "Once the fence was no longer standing, reasonable 
minds could question the location of the boundary between the parties."25 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Throughout this brief, appellant has repeatedly suggested the reasons for an award 
of attorney fees on appeal. The respondents believe they will be the prevailing party on 
appeal. (The prevailing party concept is centered on the I.R.C.P, Rule 54 and I.A.R. 41 
analysis.) 
This court has awarded fees, on appeal, when: 
"In awarding reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal, this court 
will be guided by the following general principles. Since the statutory power is 
discretionary, attorney fees will not be awarded as a matter of right. Nor will attorney 
fees be awarded where the losing party brought the appeal in good faith and where a 
genuine issue of law was presented. In normal circumstances, attorney fees will only be 
awarded when this court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought, 
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. See I.R.C.P. 
25 R. Vol. I, p. 293. 
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54(e)(l)." 
Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 591 P.2d 1078, 99 Idaho 911, (Idaho 1979) 
------------ Excerpt from page 591 P.2d 1085. 
The Minich standard is well known to all Idaho attorneys and to this court. Thus, 
it is believed that I.C. § 12-121 applies to the ~oregoing case. The principles set forth in 
Minich guide this court. The common law/ statutory principles of abandonment and 
forfeiture are well known. The parties reached a new agreement which was contested. 
No valid reason existed for the grant of summary judgment. 
Finally, I.A.R. 41 is applicable to fees and costs on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The legal theories of boundary by acquiescence and by agreement are irrelevant to the 
events after the 2015 year. Summary judgment is precluded by disputed material facts 
between the parties. 
However, the central and material point is the belief that an agreement existed to 
place the new fence on the survey line. The photos, the declarations, the affidavits and the 
sworn pleadings support this position. 
Dated this J..5 day of July, 2017. 
~~ 
Robin D. Dunn 
Attorney for Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2..> day of July, 2017, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing, with appropriate copies, was delivered, postage prepaid mail, to the 
following persons(s): 
Karl R. Decker, Esq. 
W. Forrest Fischer, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
(208) 523-0620 
RESPONDENT 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
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